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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines factors related to CEO cash compensation for a sample of publicly-held firms 
that are small, young, and growing.  Our key finding is that founder CEOs accept lower cash 
compensation than non-founder CEOs.  This evidence suggests that, for small, young, and 
growing firms, founder CEOs do not extract unusually large private benefits that harm outside 
shareholders.  Weaker evidence suggests: firms with greater growth opportunities pay higher cash 
compensation to CEOs; firms with greater outsider representation on the board pay lower cash 
compensation to CEOs; and firms with greater inside director share ownership pay higher cash 
compensation to CEOs.    
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
EO compensation is one mechanism by which outside shareholders can mitigate the agency conflicts 
between managers and outside shareholders.  Researchers have long been interested in the determinants of 
CEO compensation (see, e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990a, Mehran, 1995, Madura, Martin, and Jessell, 
1996, Carr, 1997, Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999, Cordeiro and Veliyath, 2003, and Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-
Kintana, and Makri, 2003).  However, most of these studies focus on the sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm 
performance in larger, older, and slower-growing firms.  The sensitivity of CEO compensation derives from that 
compensation which is equity-based.  Because CEO cash compensation is not sensitive to shareholder wealth, relative 
to equity-based compensation, cash compensation is viewed as inherently more likely to increase agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders.  All things equal, as the level of CEO cash compensation increases, the more 
CEO incentives and shareholder incentives diverge.         
 
Because the nature of agency conflicts can differ for small vs. large firms, young vs. old firms, and high-
growth vs. low-growth firms, the mechanisms for resolving these conflicts also can differ.  Consequently, the 
determinants of CEO compensation documented in studies of larger, more mature firms cannot necessarily be 
generalized to other types of firms.  To our knowledge, no studies have examined CEO cash compensation in small, 
young, and growing firms.  Madura, et al. (1996) and Carr (1997) examine determinants of executive compensation 
solely for smaller firms.  Both of these studies search for a link between CEO compensation and small firm 
performance.  Using accounting-based measures of small firm profitability, neither study finds strong evidence that 
CEO compensation is positively related to firm performance.   
 
The goal of this study is to investigate the determinants of CEO cash compensation in small, young, and 
growing firms.  We gathered 144 firms from the 1999 Compustat file.  Each firm had a book value of assets less than 
$45 million, had been incorporated 15 years or less, and had experienced at least a 40% total increase in sales over the 
previous 5 years.  We then analyzed the relationships between the status of the CEO as firm founder, growth 
opportunities, board of director composition, financial leverage, and ownership structure on total CEO cash 
compensation.  Our sample period covers the years 1996-1999.   
 
This analysis is designed to determine whether firm founders use their position as CEO to extract higher cash 
compensation, whether firms with greater growth opportunities pay higher cash compensation for managerial talent, 
C 
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whether insider board members use their influence to increase CEO cash compensation, and whether outside board 
members use their influence to limit CEO cash compensation.   
 
We focus on the cash compensation of CEOs, rather than stock or stock options that CEOs receive, 
specifically because cash compensation does not increase the sensitivity of CEO wealth to the wealth of outside 
shareholders.  Thus, cash compensation is more likely than equity-based compensation to be a source of agency 
conflicts between managers and outside shareholders.    
 
Examining whether founder CEOs receive higher cash compensation is particularly appealing for our sample 
of small, young, and growing firms.  We argue that founder CEOs of these firms could be more valuable than founder 
CEOs of larger, older, and slower growing firms.  This could lead founder CEOs in our sample to extract high cash 
compensation.  However, we also argue that founder CEOs in our sample of firms are often in relatively weak 
negotiating positions with external financiers.  This could lead founder CEOs in our sample to accept low cash 
compensation.  Because the net effect of these forces is unclear, the relationship between founder status and CEO cash 
compensation presents an interesting empirical issue. 
 
We use two different approaches to analyze the relationship between CEO cash compensation and other firm 
characteristics.  In our first series of tests we regress the logarithm of CEO cash compensation on several firm-specific 
variables.  In these tests we control for firm size by including it as a right hand side variable.  In our second series of 
tests we regress CEO cash compensation, scaled by firm size, on several firm-specific variables.  The first series of 
regressions analyzes the level of cash compensation.  The second series of regressions analyzes the relative portion of 
firm resources (assets) devoted to CEO cash compensation.    
 
Using the first series of regressions, in which cash compensation is expressed as the log of CEO cash 
compensation, we find that founder CEOs accept less cash compensation than non-founder CEOs.  This result is 
robust to various model specifications.  Not surprisingly, firm size is positively related to cash compensation.  No 
other variables are related to cash compensation using this approach.   
 
Using the second series of regressions, in which cash compensation is scaled by firm size, we again find that 
CEO cash compensation decreases when the firm’s founder is the CEO.  Additional evidence using this approach 
suggests that cash compensation increases with growth opportunities, decreases with the percentage of board directors 
who are outsiders, and increases with the shareholdings of inside directors.  The findings described above from both 
series of tests remain after controlling for financial leverage, outside board member share ownership, CEO share 
ownership, and the year from which the data are drawn. 
 
Our strongest finding is that founders accept lower cash compensation to serve as CEO.  This evidence is 
inconsistent with arguments by some, e.g., Morck, Strangeland, and Yeung (1998), that founders or top managers of 
family-run firms extract excessive private benefits at outside shareholders’ expense.  However, our evidence is 
generally supportive of Anderson and Reeb (2003), who find that firms run by founding families are more valuable 
and perform better than other firms.  Finally, our evidence supports Deckop (1988), who finds that CEOs who are firm 
founders earn significantly less then other CEOs. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2 we discuss our hypotheses.  In Section 3 we 
describe the data and research methods used in the study.  In Section 4 we present our results.  Section 5 concludes.   
 
HYPOTHESES  
 
We investigate the determinants of CEO cash compensation in small, young, growing firms because cash 
compensation is generally viewed a greater source of agency conflict than equity-based compensation and because 
prior compensation literature has emphasized larger, older, more established firms.  We consider whether the 
following factors influence CEO cash compensation: 
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Founder 
 
If the CEO of the firm is also the firm’s founder, then the variable Founder is set equal to one.  Because 
firms in our sample are relatively small and young, they are more likely to be run by the firm’s founder or a member 
of the firm’s founding family.  Some observers have argued that firm founders operate in self-serving ways that harm 
outside shareholders.  For example, founders might use their influence to remain CEO after their useful tenure expires, 
to place incompetent heirs in control of the firm, or to obtain excessive pay and perquisites.  On the other hand, 
founder CEOs may be willing to accept lower cash compensation because they receive substantial economic benefits 
through their share ownership or because they receive non-economic benefits from maintaining control of the firm 
they created.  In a study of Standard and Poor’s 500 firms, Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that firms run by founding 
families are more valuable and perform better than other firms.  Other studies, e.g., Morck, Strangeland, and Yeung 
(1998), find evidence that founding family control leads to poor firm performance.  Deckop (1988) finds that CEOs 
who are founders receive lower compensation than non-founder CEOs.   
 
The studies mentioned above do not draw exclusive samples to include only small, young, firms experiencing 
above average sales growth.  We do sample such firms.  Consequently, for the firms in this study, the founder is 
potentially more valuable as CEO.  The firms in this study generally are in the early stages of their life cycle, focused 
on fewer products, fewer industries, and more limited geographical markets.  The founder CEO is likely to be very 
familiar with these products, industries, and markets.  The founder CEO is more likely to have a competitive 
advantage running the firm at this stage.  In contrast, the founder CEO is more likely to have stayed beyond his or her 
useful tenure when the firm is larger, more mature, selling many products in many industries and geographical 
markets.  These factors could lead founder CEOs in our sample to demand higher cash compensation.  On the other 
hand, founder CEOs for small, young, growing firms have not yet established a significant record of performance and 
may find it more difficult to negotiate a greater cash salary.  Because these firms are relatively risky and unproven, 
external financiers of these firms are likely to insist that founders accept more equity-based compensation and less 
cash compensation.  These factors could lead founder CEOs in our sample to accept lower cash compensation. 
 
Market-To-Book 
 
The Market-to-book ratio, measured as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity, is a 
proxy variable for the growth opportunities of the firm.  Shareholders of firms with greater unexploited investment 
opportunities likely benefit to a greater extent from managerial talent.  This should lead high market-to-book firms to 
pay more for CEOs.  Also, because high-growth firms tend to be riskier, they impose greater employment risk and 
equity based compensation risk on CEOs.  CEOs of riskier firms may demand a risk premium to compensate for their 
increased risk.  Smith and Watts (1992) find that firms with more growth options have higher executive compensation.  
Higher cash compensation would significantly reduce the total risk borne by CEOs who accept employment at risky, 
high-growth firms.  Consequently, we expect a positive relationship between the market-to-book ratio and CEO cash 
compensation.  
 
Outside Directors 
 
Outside directors are members of the board of directors who are none of the following: officers and former 
officers of the firm; relatives of officers; and those directors who have known business relationships with the company 
(e.g., suppliers, attorneys, consultants, accountants, bankers, and insurers).  Because outside directors are not 
employees of the firm and may wish to maintain a reputation for serving outside shareholders’ interests (Fama, 1980), 
these directors are more likely than inside directors to limit excessive CEO cash compensation.  Outside directors are 
potentially an important source of external monitoring for the CEO and a substantial body of literature suggests that 
outside directors do act to benefit outside shareholders (see, e.g., Brickley and James 1987, Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1988, Weisbach, 1988, Byrd and Hickman, 1992, and Brickley, Coles, and Terry, 1994).  We expect that outsider 
representation on the board of directors is negatively related to CEO cash compensation. 
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Financial Leverage 
 
We measure Financial Leverage as long-term debt divided by the book value of assets.  Increasing financial 
leverage increases the probability that the firm will fall into financial distress.  Madura, et al. (1996) argue that 
financial leverage should have a positive influence on CEO compensation, because financial leverage increases the 
risk that CEOs bear personally.  However, Begley and Feltham (1999) find that debt covenants have a negative 
relation to CEO cash compensation.  We control for the effect of financial leverage, although the effect of this factor 
is unclear.      
   
Outside Ownership, Inside Ownership, And CEO Ownership 
 
We measure Outside ownership as the percentage of shares held by outside directors on the firm’s board.  
Inside ownership is the percentage of shares held by all directors, except the CEO, who are current officers of the 
firm.  CEO ownership is the percentage of shares held by the CEO.  Because firms sampled in this study are small, 
they are much more likely than other firms to have share ownership concentrated in the hands of board members.  We 
include these ownership variables to test whether firm CEOs and directors use their voting power to influence CEO 
cash compensation in a manner consistent with agency theory.  In general, agency theory predicts that outside 
directors are more likely than inside directors to act in outside shareholders’ interests.  We expect outside directors to 
use their influence to limit the CEOs cash compensation.  We expect inside directors to use their influence to increase 
the CEO’s cash compensation.  Although CEOs could use their own voting power to increase their cash 
compensation, CEOs likely accumulate greater share ownership when they agree to compensation packages that are 
less cash-based and more equity-based.  Because equity-based compensation could substitute for cash compensation, 
especially in small, young, growing firms that tend to have little free cash flow, the relationship between CEO 
Ownership and CEO cash compensation is unclear.            
 
DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS 
 
To gather a sample of relatively small, young, and fast-growing firms we begin with the 1999 Compustat active 
research file.  We eliminate financial firms, utilities, and firms incorporated outside of the United States.  This screen 
leaves 6,792 companies.  Next, we impose screens based on size, sales growth, and years of incorporation.   
 
To identify very small firms, we eliminate all companies with a book value of assets greater than $45 million.  
Firms with less than 500 shareholders and less than $10 million in assets are not required to file proxy statements with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission.  Consequently, we eliminate firms with total assets less than $10 million.  This 
screen leaves 1,363 firms, which represent approximately the smallest 20% of U.S. industrial firms appearing in 
Compustat.   
 
To identify fast-growing firms, we eliminate all firms that do not experience at least a 40% increase in total 
sales over the most recent five-year period, according to the 1999 Compustat file.  If a company has only been 
incorporated for three to four years, or if only three to four years of data are available for the company, yet it attains a 
minimum 40% total growth rate in that period, we retain the firm in the sample.  Firms incorporated for less than three 
years, or that otherwise lack data for the most recent three years, were eliminated from the sample.  The 273 firms 
surviving after this screen have sales growth rates that place them in approximately the top 20% of the firms remaining 
after the size-based screen. 
 
To focus on young firms, we eliminate all companies that have been incorporated for more than 15 years.  We 
gather the age of all remaining firms, when possible, from annual reports available on-line through the SEC.  In a small 
number of cases this information is unavailable and those firms are eliminated from the sample.  After imposing this age-
based screen, the sample is reduced to 151 firms.  For each of the remaining 151 firms we attempt to gather proxy 
statement data and Compustat data on several variables.  In many cases complete data on all variables are not available 
for a firm and we do not include the firm in the final sample used for the regression analysis.  The final sample used for 
the regression analysis has 144 firms.   
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Our measure of CEO cash compensation is total cash compensation identified from firm proxy statements.  
Summary statistics for these firms appear in Table 1.  The mean (median) market value of equity for sampled firms is 
about $84 million ($39 million).  The mean (median) CEO cash compensation is $174,984 ($162,757).  The mean 
(median) market-to-book ratio is 4.04 (2.805).  The mean (median) CEO share ownership is 13.6% (6.6%).  Over 39% 
of the CEOs in our sample are the founders of their firms. 
 
In our first series of tests (see Table 2) we regress the logarithm of CEO cash compensation on all variables 
discussed in Section 2.  In addition, we control for firm size by including the log of total assets as a right hand side 
variable.  We refer to this variable simply as Firm Size.  Prior researchers have found that firm size is strongly, 
positively related to CEO compensation.
1
  Finally, we control for the year in which the data are relevant.  For most 
firms in our sample, the most recent Compustat data were relevant for 1998.  However, for some firms the most recent 
Compustat data were relevant for 1999 (because the Compustat file we used was created in the third quarter of 1999).   
 
Also, for each of the firms in our sample, we require a proxy statement so that we can determine each board 
member’s share ownership and the status of each board member as insider, outsider, or “grey” (neither an insider nor 
an outsider).  For some firms in the sample, a proxy statement was not available for the most recent year that 
Compustat data were available.  In these cases, to ensure that Compustat data and proxy statement data are time 
consistent, we accept proxy statements from 1996 or 1997.  Thus, the Compustat data and the proxy statement data for 
each firm are matched in time, and each firm appears only once in our analysis, but the observation period ranges 
from 1996-1999.   Because CEO salaries may have changed over our sample period, we control for this effect by 
including the indicator variable Year in all regressions.  This indicator variable takes a value of one if the data were 
current for 1998 or 1999, the later half of our sample period. 
 
In our second series of tests (see Table 3) we regress CEO cash compensation, scaled by firm size, on all 
variables discussed in Section 2 as well as Year.  Because CEO cash compensation is scaled by firm size, we omit 
firm size as a right hand side variable in these regressions.  The first series of tests addresses factors related to the 
level of CEO cash compensation.  The second series of tests addresses factors related to the proportion of firm assets 
devoted to CEO cash compensation. 
 
Finally, we follow a long tradition of researchers, such as Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), who treat 
board structure and ownership structure as exogenous.  If board structure, ownership structure and CEO compensation 
are simultaneously determined, then our results (and those of prior, similar studies) may be affected by a simultaneous 
equations bias.
2
   
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 2, Model 1, shows the results of regressing the log of CEO cash compensation on all variables 
discussed in Section 2, in addition to the variables Firm Size and Year.  The only variables significantly related to 
CEO cash compensation are Firm Size and Founder.  As expected, Firm Size is positively related to cash 
compensation (p = 0.0115).  More importantly, Founder is negatively related to cash compensation (p = 0.0022).  As 
tests of robustness, in Models 2 through 5, we show the results of various model specifications.  Founder retains its 
sign and statistical significance in each model.  No other variables, except Firm Size, are significantly related to CEO 
cash compensation.  The adjusted R-Square values in Table 2 range from 8.98% in Model 5 to 12.77% in Model 3.  
Overall, the results reported in Table 2 strongly suggest that founders are willing to accept lower cash compensation to 
be CEOs.
3
  
 
Table 3, Model 1, shows the results of regressing CEO cash compensation, scaled by firm size, on all 
variables discussed in Section 2 and on Year.  Using this alternative measure of CEO cash compensation, the negative 
sign on Founder (p = 0.0416) again suggests that founders are willing to accept lower cash compensation to serve as 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Ciscel and Carroll (1980), Murphy (1985), and Veliyath, Ferris, and Ramaswamy (1994). 
2 Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) discuss the potential for a simultaneous equations bias on page 376 of their article. 
3 We also performed additional tests of robustness by using model specification not shown in Table 2.  In these specifications 
Founder retains a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level or better. 
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CEO.  This evidence does not support the view that founders use their influence to extract unusually large private 
benefits at outside shareholders’ expense.  Rather, the evidence suggests that founder CEOs of small, young, growing 
firms have difficulty negotiating high non-equity-based compensation with boards and external financiers.  Of course, 
founders often receive significant benefits through their share ownership in the firm and may also receive non-
economic benefits, such as the satisfaction of heading the firm that they created.      
 
Consistent with relatively high-growth firms competing more aggressively for managerial talent and paying a 
risk premium (to compensate CEOs for bearing greater employment and equity risk), Market-to-book is positively 
related to CEO cash compensation (p = 0.0023).   
 
Agency theory generally predicts that outside director influence on the board mitigates shareholder-
management conflicts whereas inside director influence on the board exacerbates such conflicts.  Our evidence on 
CEO cash compensation is consistent with those predictions.  Outside directors, which measures the percentage of 
board seats held by outside directors, is negatively related to CEO cash compensation (p = 0.0805).   
 
This finding suggests that outside directors use their influence to limit CEO compensation that is not equity-
based.
4
  Inside ownership, which measures the percentage of firm shares held by all inside directors except the CEO, 
is positively related to CEO cash compensation (p = 0.0487).  This evidence indicates that inside directors with greater 
voting control use their influence to benefit the CEO.  Taken together, our findings regarding board control and share 
ownership support existing evidence on other types of firms that suggests outside directors are more likely than inside 
directors to serve the interests of outside shareholders.
5
 
 
None of the remaining variables, which include Year, Financial Leverage, Outside ownership, and CEO 
ownership, are significantly related to CEO cash compensation.  For tests of robustness, we specified several different 
models to include those variables initially found related to CEO compensation.  In these alternative specifications all 
variables retain their original sign and most retain statistical significance.  In particular, Founder is always significant 
at the 0.087 level or better.  Insider ownership loses statistical significance in Model 4.  The adjusted R-Square 
improves from 10% in Model 1 to 11.56% in Model 2.  Model 2 includes only the variables related to cash 
compensation in Model 1.  These adjusted R-Square values are similar to those found by other researchers 
investigating CEO compensation determinants.
6
  
 
Because the negative relationship observed between Founder and CEO cash compensation is robust across 
multiple model specifications and across alternative measures of CEO cash compensation, we view this result as the 
most important one from this study.  Although our findings in Table 3 regarding Market-to-book, Outside directors, 
and Inside ownership are suggestive, they should be interpreted with caution because they are sensitive to different 
measures of CEO cash compensation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this study we investigate the determinants of CEO cash compensation for a sample of publicly held firms 
that are: (1) small; (2) young; and (3) growing.  These three firm characteristics describe the type of firm that many 
people envision when they think of firms run by “entrepreneurs.” Although numerous studies have investigated CEO 
compensation in larger, older, more established firms, none to our knowledge have focused on the type of firms that 
are sampled in this study.   
 
                                                 
4 Our evidence that outside directors have a negative influence on CEO cash compensation is broadly consistent with that of 
Mehran (1995), who studies executive compensation using a sample of randomly selected small and large manufacturing firms.  
Mehran finds that the compensation of top executives is more equity-based (and less cash-based) when firms have greater outside 
director representation. 
5 See, e.g., Brickley and James (1987), Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), Weisbach (1988), Byrd and Hickman (1992), and Brickley, 
Coles, and Terry (1994). 
6 See, for example, Madura, et al., 1996. 
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These firms provide an interesting opportunity to study executive compensation, because the types of agency 
conflicts they experience likely differ from those of firms examined in most other studies.  The small size makes them 
more likely takeover targets (Comment and Schwert, 1993).  This characteristic should increase external monitoring 
of the CEO and limit excessive compensation.  However, small firms also have lower institutional ownership, receive 
less coverage from financial analysts, and are more likely to be dominated by boards with high shareholdings 
(Madura, et al., 1996).  These characteristics should decrease external monitoring of the CEO.  In addition, because 
the firms sampled in this study generally have substantial growth opportunities and a high concentration of managerial 
ownership, they are less likely than other firms to suffer the agency costs of free cash flow and more likely to suffer 
the agency costs of managerial risk-aversion.  Finally, the young age of our sampled firms makes them more likely to 
be run by founder CEOs.  Indeed, 39% of the CEOs sampled in this study founded the firms they run.   
 
Whether founder CEOs are more likely than non-founder CEOs to operate firms in ways that benefit outside 
shareholders is an issue currently being debated (see, e.g., Morck, Strangeland, and Yeung, 1998, and Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003).  We argue that, relative to founders in larger, older, more established firms, founders in smaller, 
younger, growing firms are generally more valuable as CEOs.  Founders in larger, older, more established firms are 
more likely to have held the CEO position beyond their useful tenure.  This argument suggests that founder CEOs in 
our sample might negotiate higher cash compensation than non-founder CEOs.  However, we also argue that founder 
CEOs of small, young, growing firms have less established track records and have greater needs for external 
financing.  These characteristics weaken the negotiating position of founder CEOs with the board and external 
financiers.  The net effect of these competing forces on CEO cash compensation is unclear, but presents an appealing 
empirical issue. 
 
The main finding from this study is that, for a sample of small, young, and growing firms, founder CEOs 
accept lower cash compensation than non-founder CEOs.  The evidence regarding founder CEO cash compensation is 
robust to numerous model specifications and alternative measures of cash compensation.  We conclude that founder 
CEOs cannot use their special status to extract unusually large benefits at outsider shareholders’ expense when firms 
are in an early, dynamic stage.  A reasonable interpretation of the evidence is that CEO founders of these firms are 
unproven and have a greater need for external financing.  These two factors weaken the ability of CEO founders to 
negotiate high cash compensation. 
 
Weaker evidence from this study suggests that small, young, growing firms pay CEOs greater cash 
compensation when the firm’s growth opportunities are relatively high and when inside directors have more control 
over the firm’s shares.  In contrast, these types of firms pay CEOs lower cash compensation when outside directors 
control more board seats.  Although our findings regarding these other factors are less robust, they are broadly 
consistent with agency theory predictions. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics For Sampled Firms 
 
Shown are summary statistics for 144 firms that survived three sample selection criteria.  Each firm had $10-45million in total assets 
according to the most recent data on the 1999 Compustat file, was incorporated for 15 years or less at the end of 1998, and achieved at 
least a 40% total sales growth rate in the most recent 5 years (or less), according to the 1999 Compustat file.  To match proxy data in 
time with Compustat data, we use data that are current in 1996-1999.  Market Value is the total market value of common stock, in 
$millions.  Market-to-book is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity.   The Market-to-book shows a negative 
value for a minimum.  This happens when the book value of equity is negative.  Financial Leverage is long-term debt divided by book 
value of assets.  CEO Comp. is the total dollar value of CEO cash compensation, in $thousands.  CEO ownership is the proportion of 
firm shares held by the CEO.  Inside ownership is the proportion of firm shares held by inside directors, not including the CEO.  
Outside ownership is the proportion of firm shares held by outside directors.  Outside directors is the proportion of board seats held by 
outside directors.          
 
Variable N Mean Median 
Standard  
Deviation Max. Min. 
Market Value (000,000s) 144 83.99 38.76 140.81 1189.18 2.52 
Market-to-book 144 4.04 2.805 8.787 51.27 -30.33 
Financial leverage 144 0.098 0.021 0.150 0.679 0.00 
CEO Comp. (000s) 144 175 163 75 375 0 
CEO Ownership 144 0.136 0.066 0.016 0.86 0 
Inside ownership 144 0.169 0.118 0.169 0.710 0 
Outside ownership 144 0.077 0.015 0.134 0.726 0 
Outside directors 144 0.481 0.500 0.217 0.587 0 
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Table 2 
Regressions Of Firm CEO Cash Compensation  
 
Shown are the results of regressing the logarithm of CEO total cash compensation on several variables. The sample includes 144 firms.  
Each firm had $10-45million in total assets according to the most recent data on the 1999 Compustat file, was incorporated for 15 years 
or less at the end of 1998, and achieved at least a 40% total sales growth rate in the most recent 5 years (or less), according to the 1999 
Compustat file.  To match proxy data in time with Compustat data, we use data that are current in 1996-1999.  Firm Size is the 
logarithm of total assets.  Year takes a value of one if the data were current for 1998 or 1999.  Financial Leverage is long-term debt 
divided by book value of assets.  Market-to-book is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity.  Founder takes a 
value of one if the CEO is the firm’s founder.   Outside directors is the proportion of board seats held by outside directors.  Inside 
ownership is the proportion of firm shares held by inside directors, not including the CEO.  CEO ownership is the proportion of firm 
shares held by the CEO.  Outside ownership is the proportion of firm shares held by outside directors.  P-values are shown in 
parentheses.  
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
intercept   11.6995  11.6641  11.6311  11.6800  12.1268  
   (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
 
Firm Size                 0.13669  0.14057  0.14218  0.14133 
   (0.0115)  (0.0088)  (0.0064)  (0.0069) 
 
Year    0.01801  0.01880   
   (0.8094)  (0.8007) 
 
Financial Leverage                 -0.17339  -0.18187 
   (0.4784)  (0.4555) 
 
Market-to-book   0.01334  0.01382  0.01338   
(0.1652)  (0.1482)  (0.1414)   
 
Founder   -0.25461  -0.27439  -0.24894  -0.26879  -0.27399 
   (0.0022)  (0.0004)  (0.0005)  (0.0002)  (0.0001) 
 
Outside directors  -0.05618  -0.05077     
   (0.7439)  (0.7670)    
 
Inside ownership  0.27024  0.36316     
   (0.4918)  (0.3190)     
 
CEO ownership  -0.16261    
   (0.5250) 
 
Outside ownership                 -0.07523  -0.04541 
   (0.7900)  (0.8702) 
 
Adj. R2   0.1044  0.1084  0.1277  0.1284  0.0898 
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Table 3 
Regressions Of Firm CEO Cash Compensation  
 
Shown are the results of regressing CEO total cash compensation, scaled by firm size, on several variables. The sample includes 144 
firms.  Each firm had $10-45million in total assets according to the most recent data on the 1999 Compustat file, was incorporated for 
15 years or less at the end of 1998, and achieved at least a 40% total sales growth rate in the most recent 5 years (or less), according to 
the 1999 Compustat file.  To match proxy data in time with Compustat data, we use data that are current in 1996-1999.  Year takes a 
value of one if the data were current for 1998 or 1999.  Financial Leverage is long-term debt divided by book value of assets.  Market-
to-book is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity.  Founder takes a value of one if the CEO is the firm’s 
founder.   Outside directors is the proportion of board seats held by outside directors.  Inside ownership is the proportion of firm shares 
held by inside directors, not including the CEO.  CEO ownership is the proportion of firm shares held by the CEO.  Outside ownership 
is the proportion of firm shares held by outside directors.  P-values are shown in parentheses.  
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
intercept   73045  66378  70295  54542  64224  
   (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
 
Year    -5651.95     
   (0.3301)   
 
Financial Leverage                  -17356   
   (0.3762)   
 
Market-to-book   2431.68  2580.37  2428.16  2356.46 
                                (0.0023)  (0.0008)  (0.0018)  (0.0029) 
 
Founder   -13669  -13841  -12450  -11395  -11273 
   (0.0416)  (0.0024)  (0.0418)  (0.0870)  (0.0626) 
 
Outside directors  -24545  -23867  -27554   
   (0.0805)  (0.0765)  (0.0431)  
 
Inside ownership  61338  67136    14319 
   (0.0487)  (0.0192)    (0.4608) 
 
CEO ownership  -3334.39    
   (0.8699) 
 
Outside ownership                  2733.57   
   (0.9064)   
 
Adj. R2   0.1000  0.1156  0.0867  0.0633  0.0171 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
